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Government Ideology, Democracy and the Sacrifice Ratio: Evidence from
Latin American and Caribbean Disinflations
Tony Caporale*
Department of Economics & Finance, University of Dayton, 300 College Park Dayton, OH 45469, USA
Abstract: This study uses a sample of 34 disinflations undertaken by thirteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)
nations to test if political institutions impact the cost of policy induced disinflations. We find, after controlling for several
of the most important covariates in the literature, that disinflations are less costly for right vs left governments and that
sacrifice ratios are lower for more democratic vs authoritarian governmental regimes. This is robust to different measures
of government ideology as well as to alternative ways of computing the sacrifice ratio and lends support for political
economy literature which argues that political institutions have significant macroeconomic effects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cross national differences in the output cost of policy
induced disinflations (i.e. the sacrifice ratio) has been the
focus of renewed interest in empirical monetary economics
starting with Ball’s [1] influential paper. Studies
investigating the importance of such factors as trade
openness, speed, size and length of disinflations, degrees of
central bank independence, incomes policies, and nominal
wage contracts on accounting for differences in the output
costs of disinflations have been conducted by authors such as
Walsh [2], Temple [3] and Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose
[4]. In a recent contribution, Caporale and Caporale [5] test
whether the political composition of governments can
explain differences in the costs of disinflations and find, for
a sample of OECD economies, that governments from the
political right face lower sacrifice ratios. They argue that this
is due to such governments’ stronger anti-inflation
reputations, which renders disinflation policies undertaken
during their tenure more credible.
One problem with drawing broad conclusions from the
results of these previous studies is that their samples have
been limited to a set of post-war developed democracies.
This episode limitation has been addressed by Hofstetter [6]
who computes the costs of disinflations for a sample of
thirteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) nations
covering the period 1973-2000. His nations were chosen due
to their status as non-dollarized market driven economies
with populations above two million people.
These episodes provide a unique setting in which to test
if political institutions can help explain variations in
measured sacrifice ratios. Since disinflationary periods are
initiated by restrictive monetary (and often fiscal) policies,
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their costs depend on how quickly the inflationary
expectations of price and wage setters adjust to those
policies as well as agent forecasts of the credibility of such
policy changes. Although Caporale and Caporale [5]
classified government types using a binary right-left
designation, LAC nations allow for a richer amount of
variation in the designation of political regime type since
many of the disinflations were conducted by (both leftwing
and rightwing) non-democratic forms of government.
By statistically treating the Hofstetter [6] LAC
disinflations as an unbalanced panel, we find, after
controlling for several of the most important covariates in
the literature, that disinflations are less costly in right vs left
governments and that sacrifice ratios are lower for more
democratic vs authoritarian governmental regimes. We show
that these results are robust to different measures of
government ideology as well as to alternative ways of
computing the sacrifice ratio.
2. MEASURING THE SACRIFICE RATIO
Although the theory of a negative output-inflation
tradeoff and the concept of the sacrifice ratio is an old one in
macroeconomics, Ball’s [1] notable contribution has proven
particularly useful in quantifying this relationship. The ratio
measures the sum of the differences between the logs of
trend and actual output divided by the change in trend
inflation during a given disinflation episode. It is interpreted
as the output loss (or cost) of reducing inflation by one point.
This measure best fits instances where the fall in trend
inflation is the result of explicit contractionary aggregate
demand policies.
Hofstetter [6] overcomes several shortcomings associated
with the Ball [1] measurement of the sacrifice ratio for his
sample of 13 LAC nations using data gathered from the Penn
World Tables. Table 1 presents these disinflation episodes.
One important modification, most relevant for these high
inflation nations, is that whereas Ball only considers peak
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Table 1.
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Latin American and Caribbean Disinflation Episodes (1973-2000)
Bolivia

1990-1993

1995-1999

Chile

1985-1988

Columbia

1976-1978

1980-1983

Costa Rica

1991-1993

1995-1998

Dominican Republic

1974-1978

1980-1982

1984-1986

Ecuador

1974-1976

Guatemala

1974-1976

1986-1988

1996-1998

Honduras

1973-1975

1979-1987

1990-1992

Jamaica

1974-1976

1978-1982

1984-1987

Mexico

1974-1975

1977-1978

1990-1993

Paraguay

1973-1975

1979-1982

1993-1996

El Salvador

1974-1976

1980-1982

1986-1988

Venezuela

1980-1983

inflation rates at 20%, Hofstetter expands the cases for peaks
up to 30%. He also, following Zhang [7], corrects for
persistence effects by not requiring trend output to be at its
actual level a year after the inflation trough. This allows for a
long-run change in the natural rate of output thus resulting in
a higher measured value for the sacrifice ratio than would be
computed if such long-lived effects were ignored. Hofstetter
also goes a step beyond Zhang’s extension of the Ball [1]
methodology by taking into account inflation inertia, thus
allowing output to peak even before peak inflation.
In this study we use both of these measures of LAC
sacrifice ratios as our dependent variable. We designate them
the “Hofstetter” and “Zhang” sacrifice ratios, respectively.
Summary statistics for these series are presented in Table 2.1
The mean value of the “Hofstetter” sacrifice ratio is .39
which indicates that a one point reduction in inflation led, on
average, to a .39 point total decline in real GDP from trend.
Importantly, the large standard deviation, (1.70), and range
between their high and low values, (6.00 to -1.90), allow us
to efficiently test several hypotheses concerning variation in
the sacrifice ratio through time and across countries. We
later check the robustness of our results using the “Zhang”
measure.
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Given our limited degrees of freedom we test the
significance of our political variables within the confines of
a parsimoniously constructed model of the sacrifice ratio.
Our model’s variables include the initial level of inflation
from which the disinflation began. Ball, Mankiw and Romer
[8] predict that the sacrifice ratio should be decreasing in the
initial level of trend inflation. They argue that this is because
higher inflation reduces the level of nominal rigidity and
steepens the short run Phillips Curve.
We also, following Ball [1], Temple [3], and Caporale &
Caporale [5], include the total change (or drop) in inflation
in our model. Sargent [9] suggests that the size of the change
We thank Marc Hofstetter for generously providing us with his data.

1994-1998

1989-1991

93-99

in inflation could be important since a large change may be
perceived as a monetary policy regime shift, and thus could
generate a shift in expectations, thereby lowering the
sacrifice ratio.
Table 2.

Macroeconomic and Political Summary Statistics
(1973-2000)
Variable

Mean

St. Deviation

High

Low

Sacrifice ratio Hofstetter

0.39

1.70

6.00

-1.90

Sacrifice ratio Zhang

0.35

1.43

5.20

-1.20

Initial Inflation

20.50

5.49

29.60

9.70

Inflation Drop

11.15

4.76

21.20

4.10

Speed of Disinflation

4.43

2.15

10.20

1.40

Length of Disinflation

2.85

1.46

8.00

1.00

% Right Government

0.54

0.47

1.00

0.00

100% Right Dummy

0.47

0.51

1.00

0.00

Polity 2 Index

3.77

5.87

10.00

-8.00

Our final macroeconomic control variables (also drawn
from Ball [1]) are the length (in terms of years) of the
disinflations as well as a measure of the speed of
disinflation. Speed is defined as the total change in inflation
divided by the length of the disinflation. Sargent [9] argues
that quicker (shorter) as well as faster (speedier) disinflations
may be viewed as monetary regime shifts, resulting in a
more rapid adjustment of expectations relative to longer
(more gradual) movements. The faster expectations are
altered, the lower the sacrifice ratio will be. An alternative
hypothesis regarding the effect of speed is found in Taylor
[10] who argues, using a staggered wage adjustment model
that quick disinflations will reduce output but more gradual
disinflations can be theoretically costless.2
2

1

1990-1996

The empirical literature on the sacrifice ratio also tests for the importance
of trade openness. Romer’s [11] influential paper suggests that disinflations
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Modeling the Sacrifice Ratio as an Unbalanced Panel

Independent Variables

A. Regression with No Politics

B. Regressions with Political Regressors
Eq. 2 **

Eq. 3 ***

-0.39 (-0.65)

0.42 (0.59)

0.34 (0.51)

Percent Right Government

-----

-0.86 (-3.22)

-----

100% Right Dummy

-----

-----

-0.89 (-3.29)
-0.14 (-3.43)

Constant

Polity 2 Index

Eq. 1

*

-----

-0.14 (-3.40)

0.12 (1.22)

0.10 (0.97)

0.10 (1.03)

-0.40 (-4.08)

-0.37 (-3.24)

-0.37 (-3.24)

Speed of Disinflation

0.25 (2.69)

0.29 (3.38)

0.29 (3.59)

Length of Disinflation

0.56 (5.76)

0.62 (5.32)

0.62 (5.13)

Initial Inflation
Drop in Inflation

Adjusted R

2

Cross Section 2 (p-value)

.09

.12

.12

21.35 (.045)

26.29 (.01)

24.48 (.01)

Dependent Variable: Hofstetter Sacrifice Ratio (n=34, 13 cross sections).
t-statistics are in parentheses.
*,**,***
Estimated using Panel Generalized Least Squares with White cross section standard errors and cross section fixed effects dummies (see Table 4).

Building on the work of Caporale and Caporale [5] we
also investigate the importance of political factors in
influencing the cost of disinflation. The significance of
changes in political regimes in influencing macroeconomic
outcomes been studied using rational partisan models (e.g.
Alesina [12], Alesina and Roubini [13], Alesina, Roubini
and Cohen [14]). In these models, conservative (or
rightwing) governments are more inflation averse than
liberal (or leftwing) governments and are thus more willing
to engage in, or passively oversee, contractionary monetary
policies (e.g., Grier [15]). The prediction of these models is
that the probability and severity of recessions significantly
rise with the establishment of a rightwing political regime.
The literature on the sacrifice ratio allows us to test the
role that politics plays in influencing the cost of a given
amount of disinflation. That is, the cost per point reduction
of inflation (the sacrifice ratio) could well be lower under
more conservative regimes since the public will view the
disinflation policies of rightwing governments as more
credible given their stronger anti-inflation reputations. Data
on the nature of the different political regimes is obtained
from Beck, Clarke, Keefer, Groff and Walsh [16] which
categorizes governments using a “Right-Left” designation.
We measure political stance using two different variables;
the first, % Right, is the percentage of each disinflation
episode that had rightwing governance. The mean value in
Table 2 shows that 54% of the total disinflation years
occurred under rightwing governments.
Data from Table 2 also reveals that almost half (47%) of
disinflations were conducted solely under rightwing
governments. This is shown in our alternative political
variable, 100% Right Dummy, which is equal to one if the
government in power is classified as rightwing for the entire
period of the disinflation and zero otherwise. Defining the

variable in this way allows us to cleanly test whether
disinflations begun, carried out and ended by rightwing
governments have lower output costs per point drop in
inflation than leftwing or political regime blends undertaking
disinflations.
Our LAC sample enables us to test if democracy plays a
role in explaining the costs of disinflation. This is a unique
contribution to this literature that differs from the political
economy model of Caporale and Caporale [5]. Unlike the
developed OECD nations studied in most of the previous
work on the sacrifice ratio, the regime types in our sample
were rarely uniformly democratic. We measure the degree of
democracy using a POLITY 2 3 measure which ranges from
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Our
hypothesis is that the cost of disinflation should be lower for
more democratic governments since the openness of such
regimes makes it less likely that the policy changes would
come as a surprise and more likely that expectations shifts
and price adjustments would occur more rapidly since policy
changes should, at least in part, represent the preferences of
the nation’s voting blocks.
4. STATISTICAL RESULTS
In Table 3 we treat our dependent variable (the Hofstetter
sacrifice ratio) as an unbalanced panel and estimate it using a
fixed effects generalized least squares procedure with White
cross sectional standard errors. This approach takes
advantage of having repeated observations for each country
by allowing the regression error variances to differ across
nations. It also allows us to capture permanent differences
between countries by including country specific dummy
variables4.
Equation 1 shows that the initial level of inflation does
not significantly influence the cost of LAC disinflations.
3

should be less costly in more open economies. We also experimented with
including openness and found it to be consistently insignificant with its
inclusion not affecting our other estimated parameters. These additional
regressions are available upon request.

Data was obtained from the POLITY IV (Project Integrated Network for
Societal Conflict Research Program, Center for International Development
and Conflict Management (CIDCM) www.cidcm.undiedu/inscr/polity
4
A Hausman test rejects a random effects model in favor of the fixed effects
one presented.
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This is inconsistent with the Ball, Mankiw and Romer [8]
conjecture but supports Ball’s [1] empirical finding. The
negative and significant coefficient on the drop in inflation
supports Sargent’s [9] argument that larger disinflations
should be associated with those with lower costs since they
would be viewed as signaling a move to a long-lasting, lower
inflation environment.
We also find that the speed of disinflation positively and
significantly (at greater than the .01 level) impacts the
sacrifice ratio. This is opposite to the previous developed
nation findings of Ball [1], Daniels, Nourzad and VanHoose
[4], and Caporale and Caporale [5] and is consistent with the
implication of Taylor’s [10] staggered contract model. The
data also revels that longer disinflations are found to be more
costly, on average, than briefer more decisive ones.
Our 2 statistics for each of the equations in Table 3 show
that our fixed effects are all jointly significant at least the .05
level. The coefficients for the fixed effects models are shown
in Table 4 and reveal that, after controlling for other
explanatory variables, five of our 13 nations (Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay and Venezuela) have
intercept values (sacrifice ratios) that are higher than the
group average. This supports the appropriateness of using
the fixed effect framework to capture country specific
heterogeneity.
Table 4.

.01 level. The standardized coefficient is -.48, thus a one
standard deviation (i.e. 5.87 point) increase in Polity 2
results in a .48 standard deviation (or .84 point) decline in
the sacrifice ratio. These results demonstrate the importance
of political factors in explaining cross-national and intertemporal differences in the cost of disinflations.
Equation 3 uses our 100 % Right Dummy to measure
political regime type. Supporting our credibility hypothesis,
the statistical results show that rightwing governance has a
negative and statistically significant impact on the sacrifice
ratio. The Polity 2 index of democracy remains negative and
significant and the signs and significance levels of our
macroeconomic control variables are not sensitive to using
this alternative political measure.
Table 5 tests if our results are sensitive to different methods
of computing the sacrifice ratio (SR). As noted above,
Hofstetter [6] also applies the Zhang [7] method to compute
LAC sacrifice ratios which allows for a long-run change in the
natural rate of output but does not factor in inflation inertia. The
mean value of the series is .35 which indicates that each
percentage point reduction in inflation led, on average, to a .35
% reduction in real GDP from potential.
Table 5.

Cross Section Fixed Effects Coefficients
Country

Eq. 1

Eq. 2

Political Regimes and Latin American Sacrifice
Ratios

Independent Variables
Eq. 3

Constant
Percent Right Government

Bolivia

-1.60

-1.12

-1.33

100% Right Dummy

Chile

-2.21

-2.86

-2.82

Polity 2 Index

Columbia

-1.94

-1.14

-1.54

Initial Inflation

Costa Rica

-0.58

0.24

0.30

Drop in Inflation

Eq. 4 *

Eq. 5 **

1.38 (3.28)

1.26 (3.47)

-1.02 (-3.13)

-----

-----

1.00 (-2.83)

-0.13 (-3.80)

-0.12 (-3.76)

0.40 (0.54)

0.05 (0.63)

-0.22 (-2.69)

-0.23 (-2.76)

Dominican Republic

0.92

0.62

0.68

Speed of Disinflation

0.13 (1.38)

0.13 (1.42)

Ecuador

-1.86

-2.64

-2.58

Length of Disinflation

0.37 (5.86)

0.36 (5.45)

Guatemala

-0.60

-0.31

-0.23

R2

.09

.09

Honduras

2.26

2.41

2.50

25.05 (.01)

25.11 (.01)

Jamaica

1.72

2.22

2.22

Mexico

-0.71

-2.00

-1.97

Paraguay

0.12

-0.52

-0.44

El Salvador

-0.05

-0.33

-0.27

Venezuela

1.77

2.89

2.98

Equation 2 (Table 3) tests our political hypothesis. It first
shows that the incorporation of our political variables does
not alter the signs or significance levels of our
macroeconomic controls. The variable % Right is found to
negatively and significantly impact the sacrifice ratio, thus
supporting, using our LAC sample of disinflations, both our
credibility hypothesis as well as the developed nation
findings of CC [2008]. Our political regime coefficient is
quantitatively large; the standardized coefficient on % Right
is -24, which indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in it leads to a .24 standard deviation (or .40 point) decline in
the sacrifice ratio. Our Polity 2 index of democracy also
lowers the sacrifice ratio and is significant at better than the

2

Cross Section  (p-value)

Dependent Variable: Zhang Sacrifice Ratio (n=34, 13 cross sections).
t-statistics are in parentheses.
*, **
Estimated using Panel Generalized Least Squares with White cross section standard
errors and cross section fixed effects dummies (see Table 6).

Equation 4 uses the “Zhang” sacrifice ratio as our
dependent variable in a fixed effects panel model that
incorporates both our macroeconomic control and two key
political exogenous variables. The results again indicate that
more democratic and rightwing type governments are
significantly associated with less costly disinflations. The
quantitative effects of the political variables are very close to
those found for the “Hofstetter” series. We also find that the
sign and significance of our macroeconomic control
variables remain the same, with the notable exception being
that our coefficient for the speed of disinflations fails to
achieve statistical significance. The country fixed effects
continue to achieve joint statistical significance. The fixed
effect dummies for equation 4 (presented in Table 6) reveal
that five nations in our sample (Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay) have sacrifice ratios
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larger than the group average after controlling for the effects
of our right hand side variables.
Table 6.

Cross Section Fixed Effects Coefficients for Zhang
Sacrifice Ratio Regressions
Country

Eq. 4

Eq. 5

Bolivia

-0.83

-1.05

Chile

-1.86

-1.82

Columbia

-0.67

-1.16

Costa Rica

0.24

0.31

Dominican Republic

0.15

0.24

Ecuador

-1.88

-1.81

Guatemala

-0.11

-0.04

Honduras

2.43

2.44

Jamaica

1.64

1.65

Mexico

-2.01

-1.94

Paraguay

0.12

-0.49

El Salvador

-0.26

-0.19

Venezuela

2.29

2.37

Equation 5 substitutes our 100 Right Dummy measure
of political regime for the continuous % Right Government
variable. The data reveals that our fixed effects model
continues to achieve statistical significance and that larger
disinflations lower, and longer ones increase, the “Zhang”
LAC sacrifice ratio. We consistently find that rightwing
governance and having higher Polity2 measures has a
negative and statistically significant impact on the sacrifice
ratio.
5. CONCLUSION
In contrast to most of the previous studies on the sacrifice
ratio, we test if the costs of the disinflations for a sample of
eighteen Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) nations
covering the period 1973-2000, are influenced by the nature
of political institutions. Following the developed nation
study of Caporale and Caporale [5] our hypothesis is that
sacrifice ratios should be lower under rightwing regimes
since inflationary expectations of price and wage setters
should adjust more quickly under such governments. We
find, using two different methods of both computing the
sacrifice ratio and measuring rightwing governance, strong
support of this hypothesis.
In addition, since the regime types in our sample were
rarely uniformly democratic, we test if the extent of
Received: November 23, 2010
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democratic governance influences the cost of disinflation.
Our statistical evidence reveals that democracies are
associated with lower sacrifice ratios than more autocratic
regimes. These results provide an additional source of
confirmation for the growing political economy literature
which argues that political institutions have significant
macroeconomic effects5.
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